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LOS PILARES DE LA DESCENTRALIZACIÓN FISCAL
Bahl, Roy
CAF Documento de trabajo N° 2008/07
Diciembre, 2008
RESUMEN
La descentralización fiscal consiste en la transferencia de autoridad presupuestaria de
gobierno central hacia los gobiernos subnacionales elegidos, a través de la cual estos
últimos adquieren poder para tomar decisiones en materia de impuestos y gastos. El
presente trabajo presenta, tanto desde un punto de vista teórico como empírico, lo que
algunos consideran en la literatura como los tres pilares fundamentes de la
descentralización fiscal, a saber: la asignación de gastos, la asignación de ingresos y
las transferencias intergubernamentales. En la realidad, casi todos los países cuentan
con estos tres pilares fiscales. Sin embargo, no existen dos países iguales, ya que hay
diferentes visiones sobre cómo deben diseñarse. En esta investigación se discuten
varias alternativas de diseños institucionales y prácticos de descentralización fiscal, a la
luz de distintas experiencias internacionales. Como es de esperarse los resultados
varían ampliamente, lo que sugiere que aunque efectivamente no existe una fórmula
única que garantice el éxito de cualquier proceso de descentralización fiscal, existen
elementos y combinaciones de elementos que sin duda contribuyen a que dicho
proceso cumpla de una forma más eficiente con su objetivo último, que es mejorar la
provisión de bienes y servicios públicos.
Palabras clave: descentralización fiscal, asignación de gastos, asignación de ingresos,
transferencias intergubernamentales
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ABSTRACT
Fiscal decentralization can de be defined as the process of transferring budgetary
authority from central government to elected subnational governments in order to grant
them power to make decisions regarding taxes and expenses. This paper discusses,
theoretically and empirically, what some consider the three pillars of fiscal
decentralization: expenditure assignment, revenue assignment, and intergovernmental
transfers. In the real world, almost all countries have these three pillars. However, there
are no two countries alike because of the different possibilities at hand in designing a
decentralized fiscal framework. Here, the international experience is studied to shed
some light on the various institutional and practical issues arising in the design and
implementation of fiscal decentralization. Not surprisingly, results vary widely, and this
experience suggests that there are different ways of achieving a successful framework.
Therefore, this paper intends to point and describe the key elements that contribute to
achieving an effective decentralized fiscal framework that responds more efficiently to
the demands of its constituencies.
Keywords: fiscal decentralization, expenditure assignments, revenue assignment,
intergovernmental transfers
Roy Bahl
Georgia State University
rbahl@gsu.edu
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THE PILLARS OF FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION
Roy Bahl

This paper is about the art and science of building a fiscal decentralization
system. It is a science because there is a well received theory on which to build
a devolution of budget responsibilities to subnational governments. It is an art
because the application of this theory is not a straightforward matter and few
countries do things the same way.
We begin with the not-so-obvious answer to the obviously important
question “What do we mean by fiscal decentralization”? We then take up two
important

features

of

the

architecture

of

fiscal

decentralization:

the

comprehensive nature of a fiscal decentralization policy and the need for it to
obey certain rules of fiscal balance. We turn then to a discussion of what many
would see as the three pillars of fiscal decentralization: expenditure assignment,
revenue assignment, and intergovernmental transfers.
WHAT IS FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION?1
The following might be used as a working definition of fiscal
decentralization: The empowerment of people by the empowerment of their local
governments. The key term here is “local government.” Fiscal decentralization is
all about the central government‟s passing budgetary authority to elected



Regents Professor of economics, The Andrew Young School, Georgia State University, Atlanta
Georgia, USA. (rbahl@gsu.edu). Richard Bird made many useful comments on an earlier draft of
this paper and offered several interventions.
1
Also see Bahl (2008).
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subnational governments in the form of the power to make taxing and spending
decisions. In this paper, we take fiscal decentralization to mean passing fiscal
power to any level of government below the center, i.e., states or provinces,
cities or districts, and even to fourth tier local governments.
It is also useful to think about what fiscal decentralization is not. The
deconcentration of decision-making and service delivery powers within a ministry
would not count.

This is an approach to decentralizing administration and

management, and perhaps even to decentralizing some decision making.
However, the dominant voice remains the higher-level government, even when
elected local officials are invited to the discussion.

Deconcentration of this kind

does not empower the local population.
Nor would we count the delegation of service delivery powers to
community interest groups or community development committees.

Though

these units may be locally based, they do not come to power by vote and they
are not accountable to the local population.
A COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM
Implementation should begin with a design of the comprehensive system,
and should lay out the plan for each element of the system. A little reflection will
lead one quickly to the conclusion that fiscal decentralization involves a lot more
than fiscal issues.

In fact, the electoral system and the civil service

arrangements are arguably as important as the taxing and spending
components. A „one-off‟ piecemeal reform, encompassing only one element of
the system (e.g., revenue sharing), is not likely to lead to a major change in the
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approach to governance. To be sure, a phased-in strategy may be necessary to
avoid “reform shock,” but countries should follow a plan for comprehensive
reform and should prepare to deal with the transition problems that will arise
during phase-in.
The key elements of a system of fiscal decentralization are described in
the first column of Table 1. In the remaining three columns, we summarize how
these components might be structured under a more and less successful system
of fiscal decentralization. The point to be made here is that there are several
elements that must fit together into a comprehensive plan for fiscal
decentralization.
Accountability to local voters is perhaps the most crucial element of a
decentralized system of governance. Councils must be locally elected, preferably
by popular vote of the local population. If the local leadership is appointed by
higher levels of government, their accountability will be upwards and not down to
the local population.

It is almost as important that the local council appoint the

local chief officers (e.g., treasurer, chief education officer, etc.). Otherwise,
implementation will not be locally directed, and services may be delivered as
directed by the center. Other necessary conditions for fiscal decentralization are
a significant set of expenditure responsibilities and a significant amount of taxing
powers, budget making autonomy, transparency and a hard budget constraint.
The latter forces local governments to live within their means, and forces local
officials to be accountable for the hard choices that they must make.
Getting all the pieces on the table is the first part of constructing the
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system. Making the pieces fit together is the second. Coordination is not always
easy. For example, Indonesia‟s big-bang decentralization of 2000 did consider
both expenditure assignment and revenue assignment, but the planning was
done by two different ministries with little coordination (Alm, Aten and Bahl,
2001). There did not seem to be a concern about making the two sides of the
budget fit together.
Not everyone believes that design should be comprehensive. Some
countries (and international agencies) think of a fiscal decentralization program
as no more than a revision of the revenue sharing system, or an upgrading of the
property tax administration. Some ignore the fiscal issues completely and think of
decentralization only in terms of the local election system, and planners very
often focus exclusively on getting inputs from local population groups included in
the project selection discussion. The “one dimension” approach may not produce
successful decentralization because other elements crucial to capturing the
benefits will not have changed in a supportive way, or may even work to yield
offsetting results. There are many examples of problems with piecemeal reform
from which we might draw:


Russia has reformed its intergovernmental fiscal system to replace ad hoc
grants with a formula-based transfer, but has not removed its extensive
system of expenditure mandates. Clearly there were gains in transparency
of the revenue system, but this was not accompanied by increased local
discretion in the expenditures of these monies.



South Africa has assigned significant non-property taxing powers to
subnational governments, including a payroll and turnover tax, and has
granted local governments some borrowing powers. However, the
government still has not put in place a hard budget constraint for local
governments to force efficient use of these instruments.

7



China‟s 1994 fiscal reform dramatically changed the national revenue
sharing system, gave local governments more control over the
administration of locally assigned taxes, and changed the balance of
revenue availability between the two levels of government. However, no
commensurate changes in expenditure assignment were made.

Certainly we have great sympathy for a strategy of not introducing more
decentralization than can be handled at one time. However, it is important that
there be an overall plan and that each decentralization measure introduced fit
into that plan.
FISCAL BALANCE AND FISCAL AUTONOMY
The key to structuring a workable system of fiscal decentralization is for
government to decide how much expenditure autonomy they want to devolve to
subnational governments and then to put in place a supporting system of vertical
and horizontal fiscal balance.
How much Autonomy?
Fiscal autonomy has to do with the amount of discretion a subnational
government has in setting the level and the composition of its budget. Some
countries limit this discretion dramatically with expenditure mandates, limited
local government taxing powers and conditional grants.

Others allow local

governments to shape and finance their budgets to a much greater extent.
We do not have a good comparative measure of expenditure discretion.
We can, however, measure the relative level of subnational government
expenditures, and offer the hypothesis that there is a correlation. This is shown
for Latin American countries in Table 2. The data used here (IMF) are suspect,
but suggest that Latin American countries follow the international pattern. There
8

is a greater degree of expenditure decentralization in countries that are larger,
have achieved a higher level of economic development and have more
population diversity. Of course, there are notable exceptions.
Fiscal Balance
There is both a vertical and a horizontal component to fiscal balance. The
intergovernmental fiscal system is vertically balanced when each level of
government, in aggregate, has the resources necessary to finance a minimum
level of the services for which it is responsible.

In the case of subnational

governments, the resource pool would include both intergovernmental transfers
and local taxes and charges.
The greatest difficulty with defining the conditions for vertical fiscal
balance is in determining the cost of a “minimum” level of services for
subnational governments. While everyone can agree that this is determined
more by affordability than by objectively determined needs for public services,
there is little agreement about how one goes about measuring fiscal balance.
Vertical imbalance can seriously compromise the intergovernmental fiscal
system.

If

subnational

governments

are

“overassigned”

expenditure

responsibilities (relative to resources) some services will not be delivered, others
will be delivered at very low levels, and fiscal deficits become a risk. This is the
case in most developing countries.

Where subnational governments are

“overassigned” resources (relative to expenditure responsibilities), the central
government may be fiscally starved. In such a case, central services will be
deficient and there will be pressure for a central government tax increase. This is
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the situation that prompted China‟s major fiscal reform in the mid – 1990s (Bahl
1999). Most industrial countries have vertical balance in their intergovernmental
financing system primarily because they have given significant taxing powers to
their subnational governments.
The horizontal dimension of fiscal balance refers to the degree to which
individual subnational governments are able to deliver minimum levels of
services with the resources they have available. That is, even if the sector as a
whole is in balance in terms of having resources adequate to deliver minimum
levels of service, every local government may not be fiscally balanced. In
particular, there may be fiscal disparities with the poorest local governments
having the least capability to finance services.2
EXPENDITURE ASSIGNMENT
Most students of fiscal decentralization argue that expenditure assignment
is the cornerstone that more or less defines the system. The design of the
system begins with expenditure assignment. Then, finance will follow function.
Theory and Normative Rules
The question most often asked about expenditure assignment is whether
there is a theory (or at least normative rules) that will lead to placing the
responsibility for expenditures at the right level of government. The answer is
that there is, but it must be applied with considerable judgment.

2

A particular problem arises in some countries because of the uneven geographical distribution of
natural resources and the resulting severance of the link between "local" taxes and benefits when
subnational governments are able to tax such resources. The ideal solution is of course to prevent
them from doing so (Mieszkowski 1983), but if this is not possible, considerable care must be taken
in designing other aspects of intergovernmental finance, particularly transfer systems, in order to
offset the resulting distortion as much as possible.
10

The basic rule of efficient expenditure assignment is to assign each
function to the lowest level of government consistent with its efficient
performance.

A well-known manifestation of this principle is the rule of

“subsidiarity” in the European Union. In the economics literature, much the same
idea is expressed in the so-called “decentralization theorem” (Oates, 1972). So
long as there are variations among local areas in tastes and costs, there are
potential efficiency gains from assigning responsibility for public sector activities
to the lowest level possible. Local decision-makers should decide what services
are provided, to whom, and in what quantity and quality, and – importantly -- local
taxpayers should pay for the services provided. The apt phase is that “people
get what they want” so the overall public welfare is enhanced.
For some expenditure functions, however, assignment to the lowest level
of government does not lead to a welfare gain. There are two general reasons
why a public function would not pass the decentralization test. The first is the
presence of external effects in the delivery of the service. For such services,
lower tier governments would underspend (or overspend) because they would
only account for private benefits and costs in their budgetary decisions. Social
costs and benefits due to spillover effects would be ignored and society would
not achieve as high a level of welfare as would be the case if the service had
been assigned to either the regional or national level.
Sometimes the external effects are so great that only central government
responsibility will do. If the service in question is one of national importance
(e.g., vaccinations, or scientific research) or one in which there is a strong
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interest in maintaining national standards (higher education), the responsibility for
delivery should be with the central government. Moreover, it is seldom
appropriate to delegate major income distribution responsibilities (e.g., cash
transfer payments) to lower levels of government.3 Delivery might be local, but
program design and financing will remain with the higher level.4
A second reason for assignment to a higher tier of government is the
presence of economies of scale in the delivery of a service. Generally, there are
two reasons why we may observe economies of scale in the delivery of public
services.5 One is that large fixed costs may be required for the service, such as
the case of public utilities. Spreading these costs over a larger population so as
to use up the excess capacity lowers the unit cost that must be charged for the
service.

The other reason is the pecuniary economies that come with large

quantity purchases, such as the case of school books and certain medical
supplies.
Sometimes scale economics can be captured by delivery on a
metropolitan area basis (intra-urban bus services, water supply).

In large

countries it may require delivery by state or provincial governments (universities,
mental hospitals, trunk roads), or central government service delivery may be
required in small countries or for services where the good is so public that
exclusion from its benefits is not possible.

How to identify and accommodate

scale economies in expenditure assignment requires judgment and a deep

3

For a useful recent review of some of the relevant literature on decentralization and
redistribution, see Bird and Rodriguez (1999).
4
There are exceptions, of course, e.g., the United States.
5
Technically, this might be better labeled as economies of size.
12

knowledge of the service in question.
While this theory about which level of government should deliver which
types of service seems to be based on a reasonable set of rules, implementation
is not so easy and tradeoffs are involved. Most public services do have external
effects, e.g., better educated children can make the regional and national
workforce more productive. But primary education still might be assigned to the
lowest level governments because the welfare losses due to external effects are
not believed to be large enough to warrant giving up the gains from local control
of primary schools. Nor are economies of scale easy to precisely measure, i.e.,
finding the optimal population size for delivery of a service is no easy matter.
The problem is even more complicated.

A particular service may be

"assigned" to a particular level of government, but much of the relevant policy
and regulatory framework, and indeed much of the financing, may come from
higher levels of government -- and the actual service delivery may be at a lower
institutional level.6

Such apparently complex divisions of functions may work

well in practice so long as it is clear to all exactly who is responsible for doing
precisely what. But this is not always the case. As Martinez-Vazquez and Boex
(2001) show, the present situation in Russia seems deficient in this respect.
Although Canada is by no means a model of clarity in this sense -- even the
federal-provincial level is not divided into “watertight boxes” (Meekison, 2000) -6

For example, the central government may set national standards for graduates and for teachers
and may also establish the basic curriculum to be covered. Regional governments in turn may,
within this framework, develop their own policy goals -- for instance, with respect to school
facilities -- and deploy appropriate regulatory instruments in an attempt to achieve them. Local
governments may be responsible for actually paying teachers and maintaining facilities. And, of
course, educational services are finally delivered by schools which will, experience suggests,
produce better outcomes if they have a substantial degree of budgetary autonomy and hence can
react to input from teachers, parents, and the local community.
13

its expenditure structure is certainly much better structured to facilitate relatively
responsible government than is Russia‟s.
These problems aside, there seems to be some consensus about
functions and responsibilities that might best be assigned to the local, regional
and central tiers of government. Shah (1994) has considered these principles
and offered what he argues to be a consistent assignment of expenditure
responsibilities. While one might not agree fully with these proposed
assignments, it does illustrate how the theory can point to a reasonable division
among levels of government. In fact, many countries have adopted expenditure
assignments that are consistent with this model.

However, these same

principles, and politics and history, has led other countries to a very different set
of expenditure assignments (Martinez-Vazquez, McLure and Vaillancourt, 2006).
While most countries fuss with the assignment question, and split hairs
over bundling and unbundling choices, Indonesia took a faster track in their big
bang decentralization in 2001. National defense, international relations, justice,
police, monetary, development planning, religion and finance were assigned to
the center. Everything else was devolved to the regional governments. The
failure to name an exact list for the regional governments became a source of
confusion and, arguably, some inappropriate assignments were made (Hofman
and Kaiser, 2004).
Assignment and Autonomy
The assignment of an “appropriate” expenditure responsibility to the
subnational government level is a necessary condition for fiscal decentralization.

14

Giving the local government the autonomy to decide on how it will deliver the
service and to decide on how much it will spend on the service is the sufficient
condition. Central (and state) governments often assign the function to a lower
level of government but then constrain the autonomy by either assuming direct
responsibility for a part of the function, or by issuing mandates.
In many (most) developing countries, wage levels are set and even
establishment levels may be fixed, by the central government. For “assigned”
functions that are labor intensive, such a mandate dramatically limits the ability of
the subnational government to use its budget to shape the allocation of
resources. Even if the salary mandate is funded with a grant (historically the
case in Indonesia), the subnational government takes on the role of a spending
agent for the higher level government.
The most compromising budgetary arrangement is when the upper level
government determines the wage and salary level of the subnational
government, but does not provide a compensating grant.

If the subnational

government cannot raise an adequate level of taxes, a budget deficit will arise.
India is a good example of the unfunded mandate approach.

A Pay

Commission is constituted every tenth year to recommend pay increases for
central government employees.

State governments generally follow the

commission recommendations for their own employees, because they feel
pressured to do so. The predictable result is a significant deterioration in state
government finances. Indian states faced an aggregate deficit of 2.1 percent of
GDP in the first year after implementation of the last pay commission. A major
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Indian rating agency estimates that the impact of the next pay commission could
drive up the primary deficit in the 21 largest states to more than 3 percent of
GDP.
Some countries place restrictions on the composition of the subnational
government budget. Such constraints reflect a paternalistic attitude toward local
governments. The tenor of the argument is that subnational governments do not
know what is best for them and will make “bad” decisions if left unchecked.

A

more political explanation is that some central ministries want to protect their
programs (and bureaucracies) from fiscal decentralization.
There are many examples of expenditure composition mandates. In the
Philippines, for example, the local government code specifies a cap on personal
service expenditures by local governments (Manasan, forthcoming).

The

Brazilian 1988 Constitution required subnational governments to spend 25
percent of their revenue to finance education, and central regulation required that
60 percent of expenditures on education be earmarked to wages and salaries.
What to make of the practice of placing constraints on local autonomy in
deciding on the level of expenditures or on the expenditure mix? The answer is
that it depends on why these constraints are imposed. The strongest case is
when a conditional grant is used to expand local government output to reflect
spillover benefits.

The weaker case is when the mandate is imposed so as to

substitute central for local preferences, or to protect political control. This results
in a welfare cost (as noted above), the mandated levels are arbitrarily imposed,
and there is a significant monitoring cost if the mandate is to be binding.

If the
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central government is set on imposing its preferences on the local population,
then a better route is deconcentrated delivery with the assignment resting with
the center.
Accountability
In principle, governments at all levels should be accountable to their
citizens (voters) for their actions.

Such accountability is the public sector

equivalent of the "bottom line" in the private sector.

Fiscal decentralization is

mostly about changing the accountability of subnational government officers from
a reporting up to higher levels of government to a reporting down to their citizens.
The fundamental question is who rewards, promotes and decides on the tenure
of subnational government officers. But, as we discuss here, the process of
finding the fiscal structure that accommodates “accountability down” is no easy
matter.
For most developing and transition countries who seek an accountability
of their subnational governments to voters, a number of prerequisites should be
considered. First, subnational governments should, whenever possible, charge
(or tax) for the services they provide. Second, the budget process should be
transparent and reported to citizens. This can be done by the press, in town
meetings, or in government reports. Elected officials should be tied visibly to the
fiscal decisions that they support. Third, the subnational government must report
its spending and subject its books to audit by the higher level body.
REVENUE ASSIGNMENT7
Revenue assignment refers to the division of taxing powers among levels
7

This section draws from Bahl and Bird (forthcoming).
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of government. A properly structured revenue assignment system will make it
clear which level of government is authorized to levy which taxes, and will specify
the discretion that each level will have in levying and administering the taxes.
Why do we need Subnational Government Taxes?
Simply put, the answer to this question is that locally imposed taxes make
locally elected officials more accountable to their voting population for the public
services that they deliver, i.e., more accountable than if the services were
financed by transfers. This leads to better public services and more revenue.
How good is this case for increased local taxation?
Accountability.

The increased accountability that comes with local taxation

might be a missed benefit in many (most) developing countries. Subnational
government tax increases are usually very small in magnitude, and are
dominated by revenues from intergovernmental transfers.

To the extent

taxpayers perceive a linkage at all, they will tie service benefits more to the level
of grants than to the level of local taxes. Even more likely, the benefits from
increased subnational government taxes will be so negligible that they will go
unnoticed. Finally, the process of making a decision to increase taxes is not a
transparent one and the voters may not know who to hold accountable.
Increased Revenues?
Will increased subnational government taxing powers lead to a higher
overall level of revenue mobilization in developing countries? It might not, for two
reasons. First, the local voting population might not buy into the idea that higher
local government taxes will result in better services.

They might be more
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persuaded that these new revenues will find their way into the pockets of corrupt
politicians, will lead to bloated payrolls, or will be spent to satisfy the whims of the
“elite”.

Second, the better-off in developing countries have pretty good

substitutes for many local government services (e.g., private schools, security,
and refuse collection), so they might be hesitant to vote a tax increase on
themselves. There is a national psyche in some countries about keeping taxes
low (the United States), so why not the same type of preference among voters in
subnational governments in developing countries?
The second reason is that the newfound powers of subnational
governments may lead to drawing revenues away from the central government.
Or, the fact of sharing the tax base might reduce the future taxing space of the
central government. This is the fear of many Ministries of Finance around the
world.

The result is that they resist giving taxing powers to subnational

governments.
If the voting public and the higher level governments are convinced that
increased subnational governments taxation is a good idea, then the question
arises as to how it can be done and whether it can be revenue productive.
The traditional tax assignments approach is to establish separate tax
bases for national and subnational governments, based on comparative
advantages of tax administration.

This approach could lead to an overall

increase in revenue mobilization.
Typically, central governments rely on a combination of company income
tax, individual income tax, value added tax, and excises. In most developing
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countries, however, these taxes have a high entry threshold.8 Small firms, most
individuals, and owners of immovable property are under-represented in the tax
base as the result of this feature. There is also the question of a low rate of
compliance, in part because of poor administration but in part because the base
includes several “hard to tax” sectors and activities. Among these are the selfemployed, the agricultural sector and the consumption of services.
The revenue mobilization hypothesis offerred here is that subnational
governments have the potential to reach the traditional income, consumption and
wealth tax bases in ways that the central government cannot. Those who are
hard to tax under central government regimes may be less hard to tax by
provincial and local governments.
Subnational governments can reduce the gap between aggregate tax
collections and tax potential because they may have a comparative advantage
when it comes to some taxes. Three such advantages might be cited. First, local
governments often oversee a variety of licensing and regulatory activities and
track property ownership and land-based transactions. They thus have ample
opportunity to identify businesses in the community and to gain some knowledge
about their assets and scale of operation. Because the potential revenue gain is
much more important for them in relative terms, local governments have more
incentive to carry out such activities than do national governments.
Second provincial and local government knowledge of the tax base may

8

See Keen and Mintz (2004) for discussion of the appropriate threshold with respect to valueadded taxes: these authors conclude that the VAT threshold is too high in most developing
countries -- a fact recently recognized in South Africa's 2008 budget when the VAT threshold was
substantially increased.
20

allow them to capture some of those who presently do not fully comply, or evade
taxes altogether.

This would include the self-employed --- including small

businesses --- who may not be on the property tax roll, who understate property
transfer values, and who may not be registered for state and local government
consumption taxes.

Bird and Wallace (2004, p. 143) put it well: “Most

presumptive tax methods have two thresholds. Below some level, entities are
untaxed, and above that level, they are in the presumptive system. Above some
other, higher level, they are out of that system and in the normal tax system.”
Local governments may have a comparative advantage in reaching these smaller
taxpayers, in the bottom two levels. Again, the issue is one of familiarity with the
local tax base. Third, “new taxation” might lead to an overall revenue increase.
In many countries, provincial and local governments have broadened the tax
base with a variety of tax instruments and administrative measures such as
levies on the sales of assets of firms, licenses to operate, betterment charges
and various forms of property taxation.
Hard Budget Constraint.

Subnational government taxation makes it possible to

impose a hard budget constraint on provincial and local governments and to
preserve local government autonomy. This is because lower level governments
would have the means to pay for overspending, and central transfers would no
longer be the only route to budget balance.
The conditions for successful fiscal decentralization are that subnational
governments should have some autonomy in determining revenue and
expenditure levels and that they should balance their budgets.

If they have
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expenditure discretion but, for example, no authority to raise the level of
spending by raising revenues, they may not balance their budgets. In short,
subnational governments need discretion to adjust levels on both the expenditure
and revenue sides of the budget.
Tax Administration Advantages.

An argument often made for the centralization

of taxing powers is the superior tax administration capabilities of the higher level
governments. There is much to this proposition:


Central (and some provincial) officers are usually better trained and more
skilled on matters of tax administration than are local government
officers. Because they are better paid and have better career tracks, this
situation perpetuates itself.



Central government tax administration can lead to economies of scale
because of the national uniformity in the administration. This might
include centralized EDP services and record-keeping, uniform
approaches to assessment and audit, the development of centralized
training programs, etc. (Vehorn and Ahmad, 1997).



Large taxpayers (companies) often operate on a country-wide basis, and
also account for a significant share of total national revenues. They can
be effectively administered only by the national tax administration.



The enforcement of tax collection requires the administering of penalties
and possibly court actions that are well beyond the reach of most
subnational governments. Moreover, local governments in particular are
very close to the taxpayers who might be penalized, whereas provincial
and central governments are one or several steps removed.



Some taxes just “do not belong anywhere but at the central level, so must
be administered there.” Customs duties are a good example of this.



The basic goals of taxation may force central control. For example, the
distribution objective of the income tax might require a central design
and administration of the tax, industrial policy might dictate central
administration of the tax on company income, and taxes on international
trade are too locked in to trade agreements and valuation complications
to be effectively administered by local governments.



Fairness in taxation requires a uniform implementation of the tax code,
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and this is best done by a single tax administration.
government is the best choice.

The central

These advantages of central administration notwithstanding, there are
comparative advantages of subnational governments in tax assessment and
collections (see above). There is an especially strong administrative case for the
property tax to be a local government levy. Certainly local governments have a
comparative advantage in identifying the tax base, because of their familiarity
with local land use patterns. The methods of building a tax roll and valuing
properties require site visitations, identification of ownership, and the tracking of
improvements to properties, and these are tasks that are much better done from
a base of local familiarity with the land use. Central government administration of
the land tax, where this is practiced, might work in a small country (e.g., Jamaica)
but has not been very effective in large countries (e.g., Indonesia).
Good subnational taxes -- at both regional and local levels -- should in
principle satisfy two main criteria. First, they should provide sufficient revenue for
the richest subnational units to be fiscally autonomous. Second, they should
impose fiscal responsibility at the margin on subnational governments. The
simplest way to achieve the latter goal is by allowing those governments to
establish their own tax rates with respect to at least some major taxes.

9

The most immediately important subnational revenue issue facing many
larger countries is to develop a satisfactory revenue base for provincial
governments and large urban governments, that is, one for which those
governments are politically responsible. While more can be done with regional
9

Of course these criteria do not rule out intergovernmental fiscal transfers to achieve the usual
“spillover” objectives or to ensure the adequate provision of certain services at “national standards.”
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excise taxes on vehicles and fuel, in most developing countries there are really
only two important possibilities -- a surcharge on the central personal income tax
(PIT) or a surcharge on the central value-added tax (VAT).

"Piggybacking"

through surcharges is arguably the only viable way to do this while retaining an
important element of political accountability.
The implication of this discussion is that three long-accepted principles
governing subnational taxation need to be reconsidered, and perhaps discarded
(Bahl and Bird, forthcoming). First, the conventional model of tax assignment,
which in effect assigns all significant revenue sources to central governments, is
clearly inappropriate for countries in which subnational governments account for
a significant proportion of public sector spending.

Second, the VAT is the key to

successful central government finance in most developing countries (Bird and
Gendron 2007). In certain circumstances, subnational VATs may be feasible and
desirable.
Third, admirable as the property tax conventionally recommended for
financing local governments is, experience has made it clear that this tax is
difficult to implement and unlikely to provide an adequate fiscal base.
With all of these considerations taken into account, what tax choices
would appear most appropriate for provincial and large urban governments?10
The actual practice varies widely. Sometimes central governments do assign
important tax responsibilities to their intermediate level governments. The US
constitution allows the state governments almost complete freedom in choosing

10

We use “province” to refer to intermediate level governments, though in various countries they
may be called states, departments, or oblasts.
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their tax rate and base.

Sometimes subnational governments are given

significant spending powers, but little or no independent revenue raising powers
(e.g., South Africa and Nigeria).

In yet other countries, provinces are not

afforded much expenditure or revenue raising authority, as in Indonesia after the
2001 fiscal decentralization reform.
Among the taxes that might be considered at the regional (as opposed to
the local) level are excises, corporate income taxes, personal income taxes,
payroll taxes, retail sales taxes, and value-added taxes (VATs).
Excise Taxes. Largely on administrative and efficiency grounds, McLure (1997)
and Cnossen (2005) suggest that excise taxes levied on a destination basis are a
potentially significant source of regional government revenue.
Excises are a primary source of revenues for Colombia‟s departments
(states) with the primary bases being alcoholic beverages and tobacco. Acosta
and Bird (2005, pp. 262-264) take a critical view of Colombia‟s success with
subnational government excises. They argue that they are complex in structure
and levied at high rates, which has led to a low collection rate due to evasion and
smuggling.
Undoubtedly, the strongest economic and administrative case for regional
(and perhaps even local) excises is with respect to vehicle-related taxes (Bahl
and Linn 1992).

The most important tax on automobiles from a revenue

perspective is the fuel tax, which is also the simplest and cheapest form of
automotive taxation from an administrative perspective.

Although central

governments too like to exploit this source of revenue, in principle fuel taxes can

25

equally well be levied at the regional level.

Different regions could impose

different taxes, if they chose to do so, subject of course to the constraint that they
would not likely be able to differ much from the rates imposed by their neighbors
given the mobility of the tax base. Administratively, differential provincial fuel
taxes can as a rule be imposed at the refinery or wholesale level, with the refiner
or wholesaler acting as a collection agent for the states, remitting taxes in
accordance with fuel shipments.
Individual Income Tax.

The individual income tax (and payroll taxes) can be a

good revenue source for province-level governments. If structured correctly, it
can meet most of the tests for a good subnational government tax.

It can

generate significant revenue from an elastic tax base. It is consistent with the
correspondence principle in that the burden falls mostly on province residents
who also benefit from the services provided. Tax administration can be feasible.
The PAYE portion can be assessed and collected at the place of work with
relatively little difficulty.11 The “hard to tax” informal sector should be no more
difficult a task for provincial governments than it is for the central government,
and there is no reason to believe that the collection rate will be any lower under a
decentralized then a centralized tax system.
Among the few countries in which subnational governments both have
large expenditure roles and are largely fiscally autonomous are the Nordic

11

However, this violates the correspondence principle which would call for a residence-based
income tax, and for non-residents to file returns. For a discussion, see McLure (1997).
26

countries (Soderstrom 1991).12 These local income taxes are basically levied at
a flat, locally-established rate on the same tax base as the national income tax
and collected by the central government. In Switzerland, most cantons -- the
intermediate level of government -- even permit local governments (communes)
to levy surcharges at locally-established rates on the cantonal income taxes.
Like some U.S. state income taxes, the Swiss local income taxes are not
harmonized with the central income tax.
One reason local governments have seldom been given access to income
taxes in developed countries is because of the reliance of central governments
on this source of revenue.

In developing countries, of course, even central

governments often have trouble collecting much from the personal income tax.
Still, there are a few exceptions.
Payroll taxes at the state level are important sources of subnational
finance in a few countries such as Mexico and South Africa. They are levied on
both employees and employers.

Their merits are that they are easily

administrable, at least when imposed on large enterprises, and they are also
productive at relatively low rates. Their demerits are, first, that they act not only
as a tax barrier to employment in the modern sector but also encourage firms to
substitute capital for labor and, second, that in many countries the payroll tax
base is already heavily exploited to finance (central) social security systems.
Consumption Taxes. The general sales tax now found in most countries is a

12

On the other hand, the fact that piggybacked income tax revenues tend to grow with less political
fuss than e.g. the property tax, while presumably good news for local officials, suggests that
increased reliance on local income taxes ought perhaps to be viewed with mixed feelings.
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VAT. Subnational VATs have been thought to be either infeasible or undesirable
for a variety of reasons: high administrative and compliance costs, the possible
loss of macroeconomic control, the general reluctance of central governments to
share VAT room, and the problems arising from cross-border (interstate) trade.13
Early experience in Brazil with subnational VATs was generally taken to support
this negative appraisal.
The only well-functioning destination-base subnational VATs now in
existence are those in Canada (Bird, Mintz and Wilson 2006). Canadian
experience shows that with good tax administration it is perfectly feasible to
operate a VAT at the subnational level on a destination basis, at least for
relatively large regional governments.
But what can be done when, as in most developing countries, there is no
realistic prospect of “good” tax administration, and especially not at the
subnational level, in the near future?

A potentially promising approach

developed (though not implemented) in Brazil (Varsano 1999) is to impose what
is in effect a supplemental central VAT, which McLure (2000) has called a
“compensating” VAT or CVAT. This proposal reduces the risk that households
(and unregistered traders) in any state can dodge state VAT by pretending to be
registered traders located in other states. It thus provides some protection to the
revenue when tax administration (at all levels of government) is not welldeveloped.

More homogeneous or smaller countries interested in exploring this

potential subnational revenue source would on the whole seem better advised to

13

Broadly, the argument with respect to such trade was that subnational VATs were, if levied on
an origin basis, distortionary, and if levied on a destination basis, unworkable.
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follow something more like the Canadian HST approach to sharing VAT revenues
on a (statistically determined) destination basis.
Small Municipalities and Rural Local Governments
Revenue mobilization by small local governments is a special challenge.
Their potential tax base is narrow and mostly in the informal sector, and their
experience with tax administration is very limited. Things are made even more
complicated by the absence of a culture of paying taxes, and by the fact that
these governments may provide little public service benefits in return for tax
payment.

Inevitably, most of their expenditure budget will be financed by

intergovernmental transfers.
Nevertheless, independent taxing powers are important for smaller and
rural local governments because it is necessary to make local officials
accountable, just as in the case of urban local governments. Many countries
have recently begun a push to stimulate local self-governance in the rural
sector14. A reasonable goal in such countries is to get rural local governments on
the learning curve for fiscal decentralization, including upgrades in local tax
practices.
The property tax in rural areas will be much more rudimentary than that
levied in urban areas, and likely will yield very little when viewed as a share of
GDP.

As a share of local government revenue, however, it can be quite

important. The obvious revenue constraint is that the local population has little
capacity to pay, but there is also the problem of little local skill in administering a
property tax, especially with respect to valuation. On the other hand, there are
14

For a discussion of the India case, see Sethi (2005).
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some comparative advantages that small local governments might have in this
area, and some administrative “shortcuts” that they might take.


Because the community is small, mapping of all parcels might be
accurately and easily done.



Assessment might be done on a basis of physical area, rather than
value, so as to minimize skill requirements in the valuation process.



Small communities might be able to use peer pressure along with
penalties to enforce collections.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS

The third pillar of the fiscal structure is intergovernmental transfers. The
design of the transfer system is especially important in developing countries
because subnational government taxing powers are so limited. In fact, many
different types of transfers are in use around the world and it is difficult to settle
on a best practice. The kind of transfers system that will work “best” will depend
on what it is meant to accomplish.

Below we discuss the objectives and then

suggest how the practice has responded to them.15
The Competing Objectives of Transfer Systems.
Governments consider a number of underlying objectives when they
design their grant system.

Rarely, however, do they explicitly discuss the

weights attached to each objective.
Vertical Balance.

Arguably the principal reason for intergovernmental transfers

in LDCs is to redress the imbalance between the expenditure responsibilities of
subnational governments and their revenue raising powers.

With economic

growth and urbanization, public expenditure demands shift toward services
15

For a discussion of the detail of transfer systems, see Bahl (2008) and Bahl and Linn (1992).
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provided by lower level governments, e.g., social services such as education and
health, water supply and sewerage. But, while economic development has led to
growth in the expenditure budgets provincial and local governments, it has not
led to a corresponding decentralization of taxing powers. The resulting financing
gap (the vertical imbalance) is usually filled in less developed countries by
transfers from the central government.
Equalization.

Developing and transition countries are characterized by wide

disparities among regions in economic well-being.

To the extent that

subnational governments are given more independent revenue raising powers,
these disparities will widen further because the more urbanized local
governments

have

the

greatest

taxable

capacities

and

the

strongest

administrative infrastructures.
Most countries must do some equalization of inter-regional differences in
financial capacities, and they can rely on intergovernmental transfers to
accomplish this.

The design of an equalizing transfer system seems simple

enough on the surface: measure the extent of fiscal disparities, decide how much
of the gap will be eliminated, and develop a formula that will produce the desired
equalization.

However, the design issues are anything but simple and the

building of a successful equalizing grant system is a challenge that few
developing countries have met.
Externalities.

Left to make their own decisions, without any incentives, local

governments will underspend (overspend) on services where there are
substantial external benefits (costs). It should come as no surprise that local
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voters do not readily choose to spend “their” money on services that benefit nonresidents, or on protecting non-residents from any ill effects of their own
government spending. Intergovernmental transfers are an instrument that can be
used as an incentive to encourage local governments to increase their spending
on functions with external benefits.
Administrative Justifications.

Another

justification

for

relying

on

intergovernmental transfers vs. subnational government taxes is that it is a less
costly way to finance government. There are two points to make here. The first
is that the central government can assess and collect taxes more cheaply than
can subnational governments. “More cheaply” means that for any given amount
of revenue collected, the pure administration costs (assessment, collection, etc.)
are lower, and the compliance costs are lower. The second argument is that
subnational governments are more corrupt than the central government, and
therefore a shift of responsibility to subnational governments will lead to a waste
of revenues. This is because local government officials are more susceptible to
influence by the local elite, and because they are closer to the local electorate.
To the extent this is true, the cost of a shilling of revenue raised is higher at the
subnational than at the central level of government. It is more efficient, therefore,
for the central (state) government to collect the taxes and then to allocate the
revenues to the lower level of government in the form of transfers.
This argument is flawed, or at least overstated.

Some higher level

governments hide behind this justification in order to hold taxing powers for
themselves.

In fact, it may not be true that all taxes are more efficiently
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administered by higher level governments, as is discussed above.
Another issue that should be raised in this connection is that the charge of
local government tax administration inefficiency can become a self-fulfilling
prophesy.

Tax administration is a skill that is partly learned by doing, and

subnational governments are often very low on the learning curve. To deny them
the power to assess and collect will result in continuing their weak capacity in tax
administration, even in cases where the local governments have a comparative
advantage.

The better course in a decentralized fiscal system is to move

subnational government on to the tax administration learning curve as soon as
they are ready and thereby encourage the replacement of intergovernmental
transfers with local taxes.
Finally, the charge that subnational government tax administrations are
more corrupt than central government tax administrations is more accurately
stated as a hypothesis. Some researchers have pointed out that corruption may
be even greater at the central level because of less transparency and because
the amounts involved are so much greater (Martinez-Vazquez, Arze del Granado
and Boex, 2007).
Political Justifications.

Governments in transition and developing countries

often adopt (or reject) intergovernmental transfers for political reasons. These
reasons fall into three categories. The first is that the central (State) government
may have the goal of restraining if not discouraging subnational government
budgetary autonomy. Why? Because authority to make decisions about service
delivery would be passed from central bureaucrats to provincial and local
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bureaucrats, and this would significantly dilute the power of the former.

An

alternative to giving up this power, while not fully rejecting the decentralization
initiative, is to provide local governments with intergovernmental transfers that
carry stringent conditions.
A second political reason for advocating intergovernmental transfers is the
goal of enforcing uniformity in the provision of public services.

One way to

restrain local governments from making fiscal choices, while living up to the
decentralization mandate, is to structure intergovernmental transfers to limit local
discretion.

Third, a transfer system may be put in place as part of a political

strategy to hold open the option of offloading the budget deficit on to subnational
governments (for example, underfunding a grant program). The Philippines and
Russia are examples where this strategy was used.
One might imagine that subnational governments would push the central
government to replace transfers with independent taxing powers. While this is no
doubt true in some places, there are other cases where subnational governments
support the intergovernmental transfer strategy vs. the local government tax
strategy. Provincial and local government politicians would much prefer to spend
central government taxes – if they can get enough of them – than raise their own
taxes from local voters. All too often, the subnational government politicians are
willing (if silent) partners in the revenue centralization decision.
There also are numerous examples of central governments moving away
from subnational government taxation toward grant financing. South Africa is in
process of abandoning its RSC levy (a combination payroll and turnover tax
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levied by local governments) in favor of a central transfer.

A similar story might

be told for the octroi in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, which were abandoned
in favor of a “compensating” grant to local governments, and local government
head taxes in Tanzania and Kenya.
All this said, the politics may also swing back and forth between
preferences for fiscal centralization and for decentralized taxing powers. This
was the case in Russia where the Yeltsin years were a time of advocating more
power for the regional governments, whereas the Putin years have seen more
pushback toward fiscal centralization. (Martinez-Vazquez, Rider and Wallace,
2008, chapter 7).
The Practice: Vertical Sharing.16

Governments have taken three basic

approaches to determining the vertical share for subnational governments: (a) to
share a defined percent of the revenues of the higher-level government. (b) use
an ad hoc approach where the vertical share is defined by a discretionary
decision, and (c) to cover a portion of “allowable costs”, of lower level
governments.
Arguably the form of vertical revenue sharing that is most in step with the
goals of fiscal decentralization is the shared tax approach. In this case, the
central government allocates a share of national collections of some tax to the
provincial/local government sector. In effect, this gives subnational governments
an entitlement to a share of national revenues and makes them partners in the
central tax system. It provides some degree of certainty as to the revenue flow to
local governments, and it could give local governments access to broad-based
16

For a more detailed discussion, see Bahl and Wallace (2007).
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and income-elastic taxes.
At one extreme, countries may share collections from all taxes with their
local governments. The cornerstone of the Indonesian decentralization program
that took effect in 2001 was a 25 percent sharing of all “domestic” revenues. The
Philippines allocates 40 percent of the total internal tax collection (in the third
preceding year) to local governments. The proceeds from all central government
taxes are assigned to the divisible pool in India, and in 2003, the state
government share was 30 percent.

In Pakistan, the provincial share is 41.5

percent of central taxes. Prior to 2002, Russia shared 14 percent of federal
taxes (excluding customs) under a Federal equalization fund.
Japan‟s local allocation tax involves sharing 32 percent of central personal
income and liquor tax revenues, 35.8 percent of company income tax revenues,
29.5 percent of consumption tax revenues and 25 percent of tobacco tax
revenues.
There also are drawbacks to using the shared tax method of determining
the vertical share, and these need to be controlled. From the point-of-view of the
center, the shared tax approach could seriously limit fiscal flexibility because the
center is obligated to pass a specified share of its revenues to support
subnational government spending.

From the point of view of subnational

governments revenues become more sensitive to central government tax policy
changes. Since subnational governments may have no voice in these decisions,
their revenue position can become quite vulnerable. Second, a high tax sharing
rate for the subnational government may dampen the enthusiasm of the central
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government for vigorous tax enforcement thereby reducing the revenue flow to
local governments. Third, a large vertical share of central government taxes can
so dwarf the revenue raising potential of subnational government taxes that it
discourages provincial and local government tax effort.

A case in point is

Pakistan where the provincial government entitlement is 41.5 percent of total
central government taxes, but where provincial government tax effort is less than
one percent of GDP (Bahl, Wallace and Cyan, 2008).
The ad hoc approach to vertical sharing allows the central government
(e.g., President or Parliament) to determine the amount of transfers on a
discretionary basis.

Whereas the shared tax approach gives subnational

governments an ownership of some share of central revenues, the ad hoc
approach sends an opposite message: the center owns all of its revenues and
may or may not choose to grant some share to the subnational government
sector.
Obviously, there are great

disadvantages to such a subjective

determination of the sharing pool. First, it is not transparent, and it is subject to
political manipulation. This leads to uncertainties on the part of the subnational
government sector, as they do not know what they will receive each year. Fiscal
planning and effective budgeting are discouraged.

Second, the ad hoc

approach signals the central government that it may treat the subnational
government sector as one other competing expenditure request (along with those
from line agencies). In this setting, reductions in transfers can be a route to
offloading budget deficits.
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Examples abound of the ad hoc approach to vertical sharing, as is
described in Bahl and Wallace, (2007, Table 4). The most common type is a
voted annual allocation to conditional grant programs as is done in Tanzania and
in Brazil for health and education programs. The Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao in the Philippines is funded primarily by an annual ad hoc grant
program (Manasan, forthcoming). Russia‟s system of “mutual settlements” are
transfers to subnational governments (sometimes not budgeted) that are made
on an ad hoc basis.17
The size of the revenue pool for distribution to subnational governments
also can be determined on a cost reimbursement basis. Under this approach,
the higher level government defines a service for which it will guarantee to cover
some portion of the cost incurred by subnational governments in delivering that
service. Functions that are often targeted are teachers‟ salaries, health supplies,
highway construction and maintenance, and infrastructure projects. Most
developing countries include some form of conditional grant in their transfer
system.18
The cost reimbursement approach is likely to involve a large number of
conditional grants that are controlled by the line ministries and are continued
from year-to-year. Before 2004, Tanzania‟s conditional grants were contained in
21 budget votes (Boex and Martinez-Vazquez, 2006). In Australia, about 40
percent of transfers are made up of 90 conditional grants for both current and
capital purposes (Hull and Searle, 2007).
17

For a discussion of mutual settlements, see Martinez-Vazquez and Boex (1991).
For a review of the practice in developing and transition countries, see Bahl and Wallace,
(2007, Table 5).
18
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The great advantage, and disadvantage, of the cost reimbursement
approach to vertical sharing is its conditional nature. On the one hand the cost
reimbursement grants can be used to direct investment to high priority national
needs.

So long as these transfers are targeted on public functions where there

are significant externalities, conditional grants have the potential to be efficiency
enhancing.
The biggest disadvantage of the cost reimbursement approach is the
compromise of local choice, i.e., the limits placed on the budgetary discretion of
recipient governments. So, central fiscal planners are caught on the horns of an
efficiency dilemma. Stay with the conditional grant that is efficiency enhancing if
the higher level government can guess right on the external benefits of
expenditures on the function, or give an unconditional grant to subnational
governments and then deliver functions with big externalities through vertical
programs.
The Practice: Horizontal Sharing.
Four methods of horizontal sharing are commonly observed in developing
countries: a derivation approach, a formula approach, a cost reimbursement
approach and an ad hoc approach.
Under the derivation approach to revenue sharing, the total grant pool is
determined as a share of a national tax, and each subnational government
receives an amount based on collections of that tax within their geographic
boundaries.

For example, 25 percent of value-added taxes in China are

allocated to the subnational government sector, and the allocation is made
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according to amounts collected inside the boundaries of each provincial
government.
Derivation-based sharing is a way for subnational governments with a
stronger economic base to gain access to the more productive central taxes. In
this regard, it might be thought of as an approach that is friendly to the economic
development goals of decentralization. VAT, company income taxes, individual
income taxes, and some of the productive excises are included in the sharing
base in some countries. In other cases, the taxes shared on a derivation basis
are more narrow-based and less productive. It would be hard to say that there is
a “common” practice.
Because revenue sharing by derivation is not so friendly to equalization, it
is a controversial policy in many countries. It can pit the haves against the have
nots, and raises fundamental questions about what is fair. For example, Zhang
and Martinez (2003) point out that 9 of China‟s 28 provinces collect 70 percent of
income taxes.

When the base for sharing is revenues from natural resources,

the issue is especially contentious.
Derivation-based shared taxes might stimulate some increase in
subnational government tax effort, because there is a link between the amount of
tax collection in the local area and revenue accruing to the local government.
The basic issue here is whether the subnational government has some discretion
to affect the level of tax collections.
administration is centrally controlled,

In Russia, for example, the tax
but

local collectors feel a dual

subordination. In fact, regional and local governments may have responsibility
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for a part of their housing and fringe benefit package (Martinez-Vazquez, Rider
and Wallace, 2008).

The dual subordination of central tax officials stationed in

local areas is a pattern that is rarely observed outside the transition countries.
Third, derivation-based sharing should produce more certainty in local
budgeting and fiscal planning than would most other forms of intergovernmental
transfer.
Finally,

derivation-based

sharing

leaves

individual

subnational

governments susceptible to changes in central government tax policy, both in
terms of changes in the vertical share and changes in the amount of entitlement
for individual local governments. For example, China‟s move from a production
to a consumption based VAT has significant implications for the revenue share
accruing to provinces. Ahmad, Singh and Lockwood (2004) estimate that the
average provincial revenue loss (with 100 percent collection efficiency) will be
about 30 percent. Worldwide reductions in the corporate income tax in response
to increased capital mobility are another case in point.
A second common approach to the allocation of intergovernmental
transfers among local governments is the formula grant. A formula grant uses
some objective, quantitative criteria to allocate the pool of revenues among the
eligible subnational government units.
The most common reason why governments move to a formula-based
distribution is to gain transparency in the distribution of grants. This creates a
sense of fairness in that all know the exact criteria by which distributions are
made.

Still, though, the central government decides on the elements of the
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formula and on how each will be weighted.
If there is a golden rule of grant design, it is that the formula should reflect
the objectives of the grant program. Usually this implies developing a formula
that recognizes expenditure need and/or taxable capacity.

But this is much

easier said than done. Choosing the formula elements is the most difficult job in
developing a formula grant. This is because it raises the mission impossible
problem of living up to the objectives of the grant when data limitations seriously
constrain the choice of the formula elements.
A common form of horizontal sharing is through cost reimbursement
grants. Typically these grants have three features.

First, the higher level

government specifies the functions on which the money will be spent, i.e., the
grants are conditional.

The local tax price associated with delivering that

function is lowered vs a situation where there is no grant support.

Second, the

degree of cost sharing may be specified, i.e., the grant may carry a matching
requirement.

Third,

standards

of

performance,

construction,

employee

qualifications, etc., may be part of the conditionality in these grants.
There are important disadvantages to conditional grants. From the point
of view of subnational governments, such grants limit budgetary discretion and
can lead to “unwanted” public investments.

Examples abound of local

governments being unwilling to maintain capital facilities that were financed
heavily by central government cost reimbursement grants.

Another major

drawback of cost reimbursement grants is that the recipient governments may
not spend the money for the dedicated purpose. “Money is fungible.” Because
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these transfer funds are co-mingled with other revenues, their true impacts may
be hidden. Monitoring becomes all but impossible.
Finally, a major drawback of conditional grants is that they must be
monitored by the higher level government and therefore impose significant
administrative costs on the higher level government, and significant compliance
costs on the recipient governments.
The horizontal sharing of the total grant pool may be ad hoc. That is, each
year the higher level government will decide how it will distribute grants among
eligible local governments. The method of distribution can vary. It could be
purely politically driven. Congress or the Administration might just decide on a
distribution based on special interests or on the interests held by the political
leadership in this year. A popular method of making ad hoc allocations is for
subnational governments to “request” projects and for the higher level
government to choose those that will be funded.
By almost all standards of a “good” intergovernmental transfer, ad hoc
grants fail. They are not transparent, may fluctuate significantly from year to
year, and probably would not be driven by clearly stated objectives such as
revenue mobilization or equalization.

From a point of view of the central

government, however, these grants are “controllable”, and are flexible enough to
reflect the changing priorities of the center.

They might also allow the

government to move through a transition period from one grant system to
another without disrupting service delivery.
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NATURAL RESOURCE REVENUE SHARING
Most developing countries have instituted intergovernmental transfers to
share a significant portion of natural resource revenues. As might be expected,
there is a wide variation in the practice.
The same two policy issues arise as for other transfers: how to determine
the vertical share for provincial and local governments, and what instrument to
use in dividing revenues among eligible local governments.

In addition, the

sharing of natural resource revenues raises the question of whether natural
resource sharing will be separate or somehow integrated with the remainder of
the transfer system.
The Case for Decentralization
There are good arguments to share natural resource revenues with
subnational governments. One is to compensate for the economic and social
costs that mining activities impose on local communities (Bahl and Tumennasan,
2004). These include infrastructure, services for workers, air and water pollution,
and crime. The problem is putting a price tag on these costs so as to develop a
sharing formula.
There also is a “heritage” argument. McLure says it nicely: “Subnational
governments have argued strongly that they may have the right to tax natural
resources located within their boundaries, to convert resource wealth (their
“heritage”) into financial capital” -- to turn “oil in the ground into money in the
bank” (1994, p.199).
Finally, there is the question of preserving national unity. Emotions run
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high at the regional level when the center claims all (or most) of the resource
rents.

The degree of contention has led to threats of secession in some

countries.

In Nigeria, interregional conflicts over access to petroleum have

generated “secession, civil war, and the frequent demise of democracy” (Brosio,
2006, p446).
The Case for Centralization
There also are strong arguments for centralization of natural resource
revenues, i.e., a smaller vertical share for subnational governments.

Four

arguments are usually put forward. First, natural resource revenue flows are
determined by world market prices and therefore are unstable over time. Such
revenues are unsuitable for financing the essential services that are provided by
subnational governments Bahl and Tumennasan (2004). Any policy solution that
ties revenue decentralization to natural resource tax revenues will require some
feature that accommodates this instability.
Second, natural resource revenues may be too essential to fiscal stability
in countries with a large fiscal deficit, i.e., not easily replaced by domestic
revenue mobilization efforts. Third, natural resource endowments are unevenly
distributed and derivation-based sharing can lead to significant fiscal disparities.
For example in Russia, about half of all natural resource revenues are collected
in three regions (Bosquet, 2002).
Finally, there is the resource curse argument. An abundance of mineral
wealth, received rather quickly, can significantly improve the quality of life, as for
example is the case in Brunei (Heeks, 1998), but it also causes perverse local

45

effects that can retard longer term economic development. Most often cited are
a spending effect, where a greater share of domestic resources is allocated to
non-tradable sectors such as services and government, as well as the drawing of
labor toward the higher paying mining sector and away from other economic
activity in the region. Another is that the great amounts of money involved may
stimulate corrupt activities. Leite and Weidmann (1999) have argued that there
is positive relationship between corruption and natural resource abundance.
More germane to the revenue sharing argument is that many local
governments do not have the capacity to take on the large scale capital projects
that might result from natural resource revenue sharing.

In Indonesia, for

example, about 10 percent of all local governments received natural resource
transfers that were greater in amount than the general purpose transfer that
anchor the system (Bahl and Tumennasan, 2004). In Peru, natural resource
revenues account for 90 percent of the total investment budget in some regions
(Oxford Policy Management, 2008).
The Options and the Practice: Vertical Sharing
In practice, the revenue sharing arrangements vary widely. At one
extreme, Chile and Tanzania assign no vertical share to subnational
governments, and Ecuador assigns only 2 percent of total royalty collections.
Other countries have established significant vertical shares for subnational
governments.

Indonesia shares 15 percent of oil royalty revenues and 30

percent of natural gas royalty revenues (though the shared base is well less than
total rents collected by the central government).
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In Peru, revenue sharing is based on corporate income tax revenues. The
department (provincial) government share is 50 percent (Oxford Policy
Management, 2008). Local governments are also entitled to a share of royalties,
but most mining companies have negotiated an exemption from royalties. Bolivia
shares 48 percent of oil royalty revenues with its departments, and Colombia
shares 60 percent with departments and municipalities (World Bank, 2005). The
vertical share in Ghana is 20 percent of royalties, and is earmarked to a fund to
support effected local governments.
The Options and the Practice: Horizontal Sharing
The distribution of this vertical share among local governments depends
very much on the attitude of the central government toward the heritage idea,
i.e., toward the notion that the natural resource is a property wealth of the region
and ought to be replace as it is exhausted. This view would lead to a derivation
approach to horizontal revenue sharing.
Russia shares petroleum revenues and excise taxes primarily on a
derivation basis. The Indonesia arrangement is basically derivation but allows for
additional shares to be distributed to nearly all governments in the natural
resource provinces.

There is a similar arrangement in Columbia.

Other

countries have mixed derivation based sharing with other allocation methods.
Bolivia uses a combination of transfer payments to oil producing regions, and
allocations to local governments through central ministries (health and
education). Ghana directs the shared revenues to a municipal development fund
earmarked for mining localities and based on needs, but payouts from the fund
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have been erratic (Oxford Policy Management, 2008).

Peru has substituted a

voluntary support fund for the revenue sharing from royalties, where the mining
companies contribute to spending for specified activities.

An interesting

experiment in Papua New Guinea has a major mining company paying local
governments to implement priority projects, and then taking these contributions
as credits against corporate income tax liability.
CONCLUSIONS
Fiscal decentralization is about people having a say about the package of
services that is delivered through government budgets. The best way to do this
is by establishing responsive local governments that have some budgetary
autonomy. Success with fiscal decentralization can be measured in terms of the
extent to which people get the services that they want.
How can such a government finance system be built, and sustained?
First, it needs to be comprehensive rather than single-issue based. If important
pieces of the reform are left out, the decentralization benefits probably will not
materialize. Second, it should feature transparency and a built in fiscal discipline.
The latter requires that the subnational government sector be balanced in terms
of the expenditure responsibilities they have been assigned and the revenue
available to them. Without such balance, the fiscal decentralization will not be
sustainable.
The fiscal architecture of a decentralized system stands on three pillars.
Expenditure assignment is the cornerstone because it defines the service
delivery responsibilities of subnational governments as well as the autonomy
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these governments have in making decisions about the level and mix of
budgetary expenditures. Expenditure assignment goes first, then finance follows
function.
The second and third pillars are the finance component. Revenue
assignment is the leg that guarantees a better degree of accountability of local
officials to voters by giving subnational governments some taxing power.
Intergovernmental transfers, the third pillar, sorts out the vertical balance
problems and tends to the equalization of interregional disparities.
In reality, almost all countries have these three fiscal pillars. But no two
countries are alike because there are very different visions for expenditure
assignment, revenue assignment, and intergovernmental transfers.

Because

some practices are better than other, it ought not to be surprising that some
decentralization architectures work better than others.
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Table 1
The Components of a System of Fiscal Decentralization

Component

Desirable Feature

Second Best

Least Desirable
Appointment by
higher level
government

Representation

Popular Election

Indirect Election

Chief Officers

Locally appointed

Central Secondment

Local approval; hard
constraint

Local approval; soft
constraint

Central approval; soft
constraint

Expenditure Discretion

Significant control
over how money is
spent

Autonomy with
significant limits

Effectively a spending
agent of the higher
level government

Own Revenue

Significant local
power

Some local power

No revenue raising
power

Intergovernmental
transfers

Mostly general
purpose

Budget

Broad and hard
budget constraint

Restricted borrowing
powers

Mostly conditional
No borrowing powers

Borrowing Powers
Locals hire fire and
compensate

No power to hire, fire,
compensate

CIVIL SERVICE
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Table 2
Subnational Government Expenditures as a Percent of Total
Government Expenditures in Latin American Countries

Country
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
El Salvador
Jamaica
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Trinidad and Tobago

year
2004
1998
2006
2003
2006
1996
2006
2006
2000
1990
1994
2006
2005
1995

Percent
40.5
40.0
12.2
22.5
3.0
3.01
8.0
0.9
31.8
2.9
2.4
8.5
20.5
4.6
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